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Let me begin with a claim that at first glance surely seems 
polemical in character: Carl Schmitt, twentieth century Germany's 
infamous right-wing authoritarian jurist, was also the first 
identifiably deconstructionist legal theorist of our times. 
Moreover, the deconstructionist strands in schmitt's theory 
culminated in his embrace of fascist legal and politica1,practice. 
Now that I have probably irritated a substantial portion of the 
audience, let me try to explain exactly what I mean by this claim. 
Radical jurisprudence today comes, as it should, in many 
different shapes and sizes. But for at least one group of radical 
jurists, a profound and unavoidable indeterminacy necessarily 
characterizes all elements of the legal system. In the words of 
critical legal scholar Mark Kelman: 
All rules will contain within them deeply embedded, 
structural premises that clearly enable decision makers to 
resolve particular controversies in opposite ways ...[ A111 
law seems simultaneously either to demand or at least allow 
internally contradictory steps.* 
~otwithstanding traditional liberal aspirations for a binding and 
relatively determinate set of legal norms, law turns out to contain 
an irrepressible moment of arbitrariness. Legal categories are 
nothing but "empty vesselsI1 (Claire Dalton) filled by acts of power 
that force meaning into categories otherwise lacking any semantic 
substance.) Judicial discourse making use of the concept of the 
rule of law primarily serves as a mask for highly discretionary 
exercises of power which tend to favor the politically and socially 
privileged. In Stanley Fish's particularly drastic version of this 
argument, the inherently ad hoc character of legal experience stems 
from a "discourse of powertg located at the core of all legal 
experience: law is a ggdiscourse whose categories, distinctions, and 
revered formulas are extensions of some political program that does 
not announce itself as Accordingly, we would do well to 
delight in the element of willfulness intrinsic to legal 
experience, and not bother trying to limit or counteract it. 
Indeterminacy in law is a reminder of the virtues of ggcreative 
rhetoricityIgg and it would be silly to regret the arbitrariness in 
which this rhetoricity inevitably culminates. For Fish, unregulated 
power at the core of law is something to celebrate, not lament. 
If I am not mistaken, very few contemporary North American 
writers sympathetic to radical deconstructionist accounts of the 
rule of law are even remotely familiar with the fact that 
surprisingly similar ideas were employed by the authoritarian right 
in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. Today, I hope to shed some light 
on this historical blindspot by revisiting schmittts reflections on 
the nexus between power and legal indeterminacy. Although my 
comments today are primarily intended as a contribution to the 
history of twentieth century legal theory, I hope that they prove 
of mo;e than antiqurian interest. In my view, the case of Schmitt 
suggests that a certain type of one-sided tgdeconstructionn of 
liberal ideas of legal determinacy may have far more indeterminate 
political implications than radical jurists seem aware. It was car1 
Schmitt who, in the years preceding the Nazi takeover in Germany, 
debunked the rule of law by arguing that it could never 
successfully contain the unavoidably arbitrary character of 
political power; it was also Schmitt who suggested that' his 
preference for dictatorship followed systematically from his grasp 
of the inherently ad hoc character of all legal experience. 
Let me try to be as clear as possible: my aim today is to 
attribute proto-fascistic tendencies to contemporary radical 
jurisprudence. But I do believe that a reexamination of Schmittts 
legal theory raises difficult questions for those today rushing to 
discard even the most minimal elements of the liberal rule of law. 
At the very least, it is incumbent upon radical jurists today to do 
a better job explaining why their claims about legal indeterminacy 
need not succumb to the ills so evident in Schmitt's theory. 
In what follows, I describe three stages in the development of 
Schmittfs reflections on the problem of legal indeterminacy. In an 
initial stage, Schmitt criticizes traditional liberal jurisprudence 
by examining its failure to grapple adequately with the enigma of 
legal indeterminacy. In a second stage, Schmitt radicalizes his 
early reflections on the enigma of legal indeterminacy by arguing 
that the problem of indeterminacy is pervasive within the legal 
system, in part because it is rooted in an inevitable and 
unavoidable willfulness that lies at the basis of all legal 
experience. In the final stage, Schmitt emphasizes the problem of 
legal indeterminacy in order to justify an authoritarian 
alternative to Weimar democracy. 
(1) In the first stage, Schmitt offers an oftentimes persuasive 
criticism of traditional mechanical interpretations of judicial 
decision making, influenced by Montesquieu, according to which 
every conceivable case and situation can be unambiguously subsumed 
under a set of crystal clear general norms. As Max Weber famously 
described this traditional view, the judge is nothing but "an 
automaton into which legal documents and fees are stuffed at the 
top in order that [they] may spill forth the verdict at the bottom 
along with the reasons, read mechanically from codified 
paragraphs. lts 
But as Schmitt notes, only if laws could always be perfectly 
clear and transparent in character could this mechanical view of 
judicial action claim to possess real value. In light of the 
indisputable fact that only a tiny number of cases involves 
adequately clear legal norms and acts obviously meant to be 
determined by them, mechanical concepts of "subsumptionw only apply 
to unusual legal cases. Notwithstanding the claims of traditional 
liberal jurisprudence, the overwhelming majority of cases 
inevitably are what Ronald Dworkin more recently has described as 
"hardu cases. Indeed, for the young Schmitt, as for Dworkin, early 
liberal conceptions of a "mechanical and automatic binding" of the 
judge to the legal norm are profoundly misleading for one simple 
reason: they obscure the complexity of judicial decision making and 
thereby exaggerate the number of "easyvv cases facing judges. 
Schmitt then proceeds to offer a critique of various attempts 
to compensate for the inadequacies of mechanical jurisprudence. To 
those who admit that judges necessarily are forced to downplay the 
letter of the law and instead should focus on legislative intent, 
Schmitt responds that such views rest on a misleading conflation of 
state organs with concrete individual human beings: for Schmitt, 
the homogeneous, unified will implicitly presupposed by attempts to 
focus on the "intent of the legislatorr1 is a fiction, a misleading 
personalization of state activity that fails to capture the 
complexity of legislative politics. When relying on concepts of 
legislative intent, judges inevitably construct an ideal 
legislator with little real relationship to the actual historical 
legislative process. "A 'willf suspended in the air above the judge 
is always first and foremost the result of an interpretationIrr and 
not, as is often claimed by those trying to get as much mileage as 
possible from concepts of legislative intent, an objective state of 
affairs that a judge merely concretizes when engaging in legal 
interpretation (GJ: 27) . Ideas of legislative "willrr or "intentw are 
the product of legal interpretation, not its starting point. A 
creative interpretive act first makes Dossible those standards 
which judicial decision makers then, misleadingly, claim compose 
the -basis of their decisions. 
~ What then of those who claim that the overall determinacy of 
legal decisionmaking can be salvaged by suw~lementinq traditional 
legal concepts with new and more flexible legal standards? 
According to this (common) view, some judicial discretion is 
unavoidable; nonetheless, its scope can be defined and delineated 
by means of a reliance on relatively open-ended legal standards 
that, in effect, Ittell" a judge or administrator when discretion is 
appropriate. 
For Schmitt, those who hope to salvage the rule of law ideal by 
means of this strategy make things too easy for themselves. In his 
interpretation, proponents of this view implicitly assume that 
judges still nsubsumett individual legal acts under a set of legal 
rules, albeit under a set of rules that has been substantially 
broadened. But the addition of vague standards into the legal 
system necessarily robs the concept of legal subsumption of any 
real substance: vague standards (e.g., "the needs of commercen) 
inevitably permit a rich diversity of alternative --and potentially 
contradictory-- answers to a particular legal case (GJ: 20-21, 40- 
41). Despite claims to the contrary, reliance on such standards 
necessarily contradicts the normative core of the liberal rule of 
law, namely the idea that law should effectively bind or constrain 
judicial actors. 
Reliance on vague legal standards thus cannot save liberal 
concepts of legal determinacy. The most important conclusion of the 
young Schmitt's legal theory is that legal decision making is 
always characterized by what he describes as a "moment" of 
"indifference in reference to the content of the lawn (GJ: 67). 
That is, the relationship between the legal norm and the judicial 
actor inevitably involves an element of taindifferencelt or 
indeterminacy. An unbridgeable "gapgt inevitably separates legal 
actors and legal texts. Within this gap, discretion is unavoidable. 
(2) The second stage of Schmittls .reflections on legal 
indeterminacy takes a more radical texture. Whereas Schmitt 
initially focussed on debunkinq liberal views of judicial action in 
order to demonstrate the unavoidability of legal indeterminacy, his 
subsequent writings locate the fundamental source of the 
"indifference in reference to the content of lawn in an act of 
arbitrariness or willfulness --in an expression of "pure power1* 
unrestrained by legal norms. 
Crucial here is a 1914 monograph, The Value of the State and the 
Sianificance of the Individual. Here, Schmitt first seems to 
endorse some typically liberal ideas. But he does so only in order 
to suggest that their implications, in fact, are profoundly anti- 
liberal. Schmitt now writes that views of law that reduce it to 
: L. nothing but a wgamell among competing power interests obscure law's 
. +- normative character. Power-realist accounts of law provide no place 
for 'making sense of the tasks of legal argumentation and, 
justification. By reducing law to an epiphenomenon of power, they 
deny the integrity of legal experience; they can only speak 
coherently about the "factsw of empirical power, but hardly of the 
legal system as consisting of a set of **normsn requiring 
justification. "If law is to exist, it cannot be derived from 
power, for the gap between law and power simply cannot be bridged" 
(WSBE: 29). Echoing elements of Hans Kelsen's "pure theory of 
lawI1* Schmitt then insists on a clear delineation between legal 
experience and empirical power relations. The sphere of facticity, 
of concrete power relations, cannot ground normativity, the sphere 
of legal norms. Thus, law and power need to be seen as constituting 
two distinct spheres. Law constitutes a "pure" set of norms, the 
realm of "oughtM (Sollen), in stark contrast to the facticity 
(Sein) of empirical power struggles. In this view, "pure laww 
(untainted by power) initially stands opposed to "pure (that is, 
legally unregulated) power." 
But according to Schmitt, it is precisely the function of the 
state to try to link the two spheres of power and law. State organs 
undertake to translate the norms of the abstract legal universe 
into concrete reality. The state acts, as a transmission belt 
between the legal sphere and.the world of everyday power politics, 
between normativity and facticity. By undertaking to realize 
abstract legal norms, state institutions find themselves situated 
fruitfully between the realms of facticity and normativity, and 
thus capable of mediating between the two spheres. Yet this 
mediation comes at a price. To the extent that the state makes it 
possible to render the luheavenlyu realm of legal normativity 
relevant for the mundane sphere of "earthlyH facticity, law is 
forced to surrender its heavenly character. More specifically, law 
is forced to make concessions to a universe (the sphere of pure 
power) to its own internal dynamics. What form must this compromise 
take? Schmittts answer is unambiguous: law inevitably contains 
elements of that universe which it has been forced to enter into a 
compact with, namely the sphere of empirical power. When realized 
by governmental bodies, law includes a moment of normatively 
unregulated facticity, of pure Dower or willfulness. In Schmittfs 
own more familiar terminology from the 1920s, a sovereign decision 
"not based on reason and discussion and not justifying itself ... an 
absolute decision created out of nothingness," is essential to 
legal experience (=:66). 
However idiosyncratic, Schmittls argument here is crucial for 
understanding the quite radical assertions about legal 
indeterminacy which he makes in the 1920s and early '30s. In 1912, 
Schmitt originally spoke of a mere ttmomentv of "indifference in 
reference to the content of law." The term "moment" might suggest 
that indeterminacy is nothing but one among a number of distinct 
elements constitutive of legal experience, maybe even that law for 
the most part can be rendered determinate and predictable. Yet if 
the "indifference in reference to the content of lawt1 initially 
described by Schmitt derives, as he now openly argues, from an act 
of "pure powerM or perfect willfulness underlying all legal 
experience, it makes little sense to speak merely of a "momentn of 
arbitrariness within law. If the element of power within law is 
aenuinely tlwuren or perfectly willful. it would seem to follow that 
it is potentially unlimited: by definition, pure power or pure 
willfulness probably must remain an untamed and (normatively) 
unreaulated form of power. Thus, what was first described as a 
"momenttt of legal indeterminacy is likely to become truly pervasive 
--in fact, law's most striking feature. Arbitrariness seems 
destined to make up a ubiauitous facet of every feature of legal 
experience. 
Indeed, this is precisely the position sketched out in many of 
Schmittfs Weimar era writings. Schmitt writes in Political Theolosy 
that "[all1 law is 'situational lawf" (E: 13). In its very 
essence, all legal experience is permeated by indeterminacy, 
deriving from the ever-changing political imperatives of those who 
realize, enforce and interpret the law. Notwithstanding liberal 
myths to the contrary, even the most unambiguous legal concepts 
remain "infinitely pliableu (=:17); every judicial act is' an 
intrinsically political act in which judges make unregulated 
"sovereign decisionsw in favor of a particular political agenda 
(m: 31) . As Schmitt infamously comments in The Concept of the 
Political, Itthe sovereignty of law means only the sovereignty of 
men who draw up and administer the lawu (E: 67). 
(3) In a third stage, Schmitt explicitly links the problem of 
legal indeterminacy to his preference for political 
authoritarianism. Beginning in the 1920s and culminating in 
Schmittrs enthusiastic embrace of Nazism in 1933, he argues that 
dictatorship and legal indeterminacy exist in a relation of 
"elective affinity." Just as the liberal faith in clear, 
determinate law is intimately related to parliamentary democracy, 
so too are dictatorship and legal indeterminacy the closest of 
allies. For Schmitt, dictatorship is that political form most 
appropriate to the experience of legal indeterminacy. The concept 
of dictatorship thus constitutes nothing less than the "missing 
link" of modern jurisprudence: dictatorship alone provides a 
practical "answer" to the riddle of legal indeterminacy. 
In his 1921 study on dictatorship, Schmitt restates his 
position that an uopposition" inevitably exists between a legal 
norm and the method of realizing it. But he now makes the 
additional claim that the omnipresent possibility of a gap between 
legal norms and their realization in the concrete world is 
precisely "where the essence of dictatorship liesu (D: viii). "To 
speak in abstract terms, the problem of dictatorship, which far too 
rarely has been systematically analyzed, is the problem of the 
concrete exception within legal theoryu (~:ix) . 6  For Schmitt, 
essential to a dictatorial regime is its reliance on situation- 
specific acts that cannot be legally ascertained beforehand. In 
this interpretation, a dictator is given a free hand to make use of 
individual or concrete measures in accordance with the imperatives 
of a specific political task at hand; he breaks through the "crustw 
of the legal system in order to undertake power decisions incapable 
of gaining proper legal codification. In short, the legal core of 
dictatorship is profoundly discretionary. 
In light of Schmittfs simultaneous reflections on the 
pervasiveness of legal indeterminacy, the conceptual marriage of 
dictatorship to legal indeterminacy here inevitably has radical 
implications. To the extent that legal actors inevitably, engage in 
discretionary "power decisionsw when they interpret and apply legal 
norms, "dictatorialu power would seem to be a pervasive facet of 
everyday legal experience. By the same token, that regime type 
which makes the possibility of far-reaching discretion its very , 
core --in other words, an unambiguously and - self-consciously 
dictatorial regime-- would seem best attuned to the imperatives of 
a legal universe defined by the experience of legal indeterminacy. 
In the late '20s Schmitt complements this somewhat abstract 
claim with an empirical argument about legal development. He argues 
that the widely discussed proliferation of vague, open-ended legal 
standards ("in good faith," ""in the public interest," "public 
ordertt) in twentieth century law provides the best concrete 
evidence for the anachronistic character of liberal conceptions of 
legal determinacy --a the inevitability of dictatorship. Schmitt 
sides with those who believe that the unavoidable growth of 
extensive state intervention in the modern capitalist economy 
necessitates non-classical forms of law. Vague legal standards 
become 81unavoidable and indispensableet as state activity inevitably 
becomes increasingly ambitious in character (m: 43). In this 
view, new, open-ended legal forms necessitate corresponding 
postliberal forms of governmental decision making: specifically, 
they require judicial and administrative discretion on a scale 
unheard of within liberal democracy. For Schmitt, only a 
dictatorship is likely to prove up to the task of providing for 
discretion on this scale: as he openly declares in 1932, the growth 
of "the administrative state which manifests itself in the 'praxisf 
of measures" --in other words, a system of indeterminate, 
situation-oriented law like that required by the contemporary 
interventionist state --"is more likely appropriate to a 
'dictatorshipf than the classical parliamentary statew (LJ: 87). 
But in light of the "elective affinityn between legal 
indeterminacy and dictatorship as well as the unavoidability of the 
former, why not simply dump liberal democracy for a dictatorial 
alternative better suited to the demands of legal indeterminacy? 
Of course, Schmitt ultimately opted to do just that. Although 
he probably preferred an alternative authoritarian solution to 
Weimarfs crisis before 1933, he showed few reservations about 
embracing the Nazis in the immediate aftermath of their takeover. 
In a series of shocking anti-semitic apologies defending the Nazis 
in the early and mid-1930s, Schmitt repeatedly relies on his 
previous reflections on the problem of legal indeterminacy in order 
to defend the new dictatorship. "All existing legal concepts are 
'indeterminate' legal concepts," Schmitt writes in 1933 (m: 43- 
44). Because the demand for determinate law is the very core of the 
ideal of the rule of law, for Schmitt the emerging Nazi legal order 
would do well to distance itself from anachronistic ideas of a so- 
called Itrule of law." And because the ubiquity of legal 
indeterminacy points to the unavoidability of.arbitrary political 
power, for Schmitt only a dictatorship --like that sought by the 
~azis--' is suitable to the legal dictates of our times. 
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